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STATEOFNEWYORK-BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name:· Jeter, Darryl Facility: Woqdbourne CF 
NYSID: 






Marshall Nadan, Esq. 
PO Box 4091 




May 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 months. 
Cruse, Alexander 
Appellant's Brief received August 20, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
. Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. ' 
/ . 
The u.riclersigned de~errnine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
. '-..IL...l<~-4-~+--->.---_.. >~~ ffirmed _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Mo~med to - -~P . ----
c~. • 
LV_,.-,;'.ll •  ''-'<. ~ :-----.. • 
Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
/ 
Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de ·novo interview _ Modified io ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written · 
reasons fo~ the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This F~nal Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unjt's ·Findings and the separate findings of 
the Parole Board, if any ,.were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ?./i 0 /').. 0 l{) .. . . . U3 
Distribution: ·Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (1112018) 
- -- ·-·- ·--.. ·------------- ---
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Jeter, Darryl DIN: 85-B-1248  
Facility: Woodbourne CF AC No.:  06-065-19 B 
    
Findings: (Page 1 of 4) 
 
Appellant challenges the May 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 18-month hold. The instant offense involved the appellant being pursued by a female police 
officer after she observed him attempt to snatch a gold chain from a passenger on a train.  When 
the officer attempted to apprehend him, he overpowered her, took her gun, and shot her twice in 
the head at close range before fleeing the scene with the gun. Appellant raises the following issues: 
1) the decision was arbitrary and capricious because it relied solely on the seriousness of the crime 
and the Board’s perception that he did not show remorse; 2) the Board did not consider the 
COMPAS instrument’s low scores or Appellant’s rehabilitation as required by the 2011 
amendments; 3) community and official opposition should not have played a role in the Board’s 
decision; 4) the Board relied on erroneous information when citing one of Appellant’s answers in 
the decision; and 5) the Board effectively resentenced Appellant. These arguments are without 
merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for 
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The 
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  In the absence 
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 
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157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the 
appropriate factors, including: Appellant’s instant offense of two counts of Murder in the second 
degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the second degree, committed while on community 
supervision; Appellant’s institutional efforts including marginal disciplinary record and a Tier III 
ticket since his last appearance, receipt of a GED, anticipated graduation from college, custodial 
and food service training,  and AVP; and release plans to live with his 
wife and work at a non-profit organization. The Board also had before it and considered, among 
other things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, the sentencing minutes, official statements 
from the District Attorney and his defense attorney, and Appellant’s parole packet including letters 
of support and assurance.  
 
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining 
release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching 
its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense wherein Appellant murdered a 
police officer while on community supervision, Appellant’s marginal disciplinary record, and his 
minimal expressions of remorse. See Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 
A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Jones v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. 
& Cmty. Supervision, 151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 2017); Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Byas v. Fischer, 120 
A.D.3d 1586-87, 1586, 992 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Thompson v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); 
Matter of Guzman v. Dennison, 32 A.D.3d 798, 799, 821 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (1st Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 
2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 
N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 
A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 
343 (2012); Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000); Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); 
Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018). The Board 
also noted official and community opposition. See Matter of Applegate, 164 A.D.3d at 997, 82 
N.Y.S.3d 240; Matter of Applewhite v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380, 91 
N.Y.S.3d 308, 311 (3d Dept. 2018), appeal dismissed, 32 N.Y.3d 1219 (2019); Matter of Porter v. 
Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009). While the Board does not agree that 
aggravating factors are always required to support emphasis on an inmate’s offense, Matter of 
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Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, the Board’s decision here was based on additional 
considerations including Appellant’s disciplinary record. 
 
Inasmuch as Appellant disputes the Board’s finding with respect to remorse, it was well within 
the Board’s authority to make an assessment of Appellant’s credibility (Matter of Siao-Pao v. 
Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept.), aff’d, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 866 
N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008)) and there is record support.  A review of the transcript reveals Appellant 
focused primarily on his accomplishments and did not express regret until his final statement. 
Appellant’s contention that the Board relied on erroneous information when citing one of his 
answers in the decision is also unavailing. The record reveals that, when asked if he thought justice 
was served by this sentence, Appellant’s answer included the phrase, “I would say yes because 
I’m saying I’m not who I was.” (Tr. at 16.) The Board was entitled to interpret the answer as 
showing limited remorse for his victim. 
 
Appellant’s contention that the Board did not consider the COMPAS instrument’s low scores 
or Appellant’s rehabilitation as required by the 2011 amendments is without merit. The 2011 
amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in 
making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement 
in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 
N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 
1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 
1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  This is encompassed in the Board’s 
regulations.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a).   However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never 
intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information 
from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 
amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of 
each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense.  The amendments 
also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when 
deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS cannot 
mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d 
Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along 
with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  
See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017).  That is exactly what occurred here.  
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Appellant’s objection to the Board’s consideration of community opposition is likewise 
without merit. The Board may receive and consider written communications from individuals, other 
than those specifically identified in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A), opposing an inmate’s release to 
parole supervision.  See, e.g., Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d at 
997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240; Matter of Clark v. New York Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 531-31, 89 
N.Y.S.3d 134, 135 (1st Dept. 2018); Matter of Rivera v. Evans, Index No. 0603-16, Decision & 
Order dated July 5, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Co.)(LaBuda A.J.S.C.), aff’d sub nom. Matter of 
Rivera v. Stanford, 53 N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 2017); see also Matter of 
Campbell v. Stanford, 173 A.D.3d at 1016, 105 N.Y.S.3d at 465.  The same has long been 
recognized as true with respect to letters supporting an inmate’s potential parole release.   
 
The Board may also consider a district attorney’s recommendation to deny parole.  Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); 
Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker 
v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).  
 
Finally, Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper 
resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the 
propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth 
therein.  Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 
1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of 
Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested 
with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period 
of incarceration set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 
283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d 
Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any 
manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 
1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
